(It has been more than three years since the last article by Thisrupt. Let us begin again by laying the groundwork for understanding Thai politics.)
If one had fallen into a coma on May 22, 2014, right after General Prayuth Chan-o-cha took power in a military coup, waking up today is an experience in an alternate dimension. Really? Thaksin Shinawatra is back, and not a single day in prison? Wait, who are these young people who won the General Election in 2023? Hang on, who did General Prayuth’s handpicked senators vote for as prime minister? Just a second, Thaksin’s daughter is now prime minister?
We can play the same game with all kinds of different scenarios. Witnessing the height of the Youth Movement in 2020-2021, seeing the reformist, young-generation Move Forward Party (now called the People’s Party) winning the 2023 General Election, falling into a coma contentedly, believing that, at last, one has lived long enough to see genuine changes in Thailand. Only to wake up yesterday and cry, “Blasted! It’s all still the same people in government! Except for that one… who is that? Thaksin’s daughter? … I’m going back to sleep.”
The Thai political melodrama can be befuddled, but not if you understand why nothing has changed. No matter who the government is, regardless of dictatorship or democracy, the same three groups of people are ruling: the generals, the capitalists, and the big bosses.
There’s also another, the most powerful force, called the “invisible power” in Thailand. Since the entire kingdom pretends that it is invisible, this article shall do the same.
The Generals
Arguably, every country has a Deep State. But perhaps no Deep State is more profound than the Thai Deep State. It has been over 92 years since the 1932 Revolution that toppled the absolute monarchy, intended to guide the kingdom toward democracy. Within a year, the military elements within the revolutionaries overthrew the government and established a dictatorship.
Since 1932, we have had 13 successful military coups, 21 if including the unsuccessful ones. That’s roughly an average of one coup every four years, a similar frequency as the Olympics or the World Cup. Thailand has had more generals than civilians in charge of the country. This includes outright military governments through most of the 30s to the 70s, or in the 1980s, when democratic elections were held, still, the parliament knew to always vote for General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime minister.
The 21st century had seen two military coups, six years of military dictatorship, and an additional four years of General Prayuth through a fraudulent electoral system. The present civilian government led by Thaksin’s daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, is trying its best not to upset military power. For instance, during the 2023 election campaign, the Pheu Thai Party discussed military reforms, including cutting the defense budget by 10%. Upon becoming government, the Pheu Thai-led coalition specifically stressed that there would be no “reform,” only “development,” while the defense budget was increased by two percent.
The Thai military is a power unto itself, appointing its own chiefs, running its own Military Parliament, and ruling the three troubled southern provinces—Yala, Songkla, and Nakorn Si Thammarat—as warlords and fiefdoms. It manages business conglomerates, including real estate, golf courses, TV and radio stations, and oil and electricity, while generals sit on the board of all 56 state enterprises in Thailand. A well-connected private sector would have a general on its board as assurance for smooth business operation. This does not include alleged involvement in illegal gambling and human and drug trafficking.
Hence, a general may not be the prime minister, but the generals are still in charge.
The Capitalists
In Thailand, it’s not a secret that the top generals—whether military or police—retire either millionaires or billionaires. General Prayuth retired as a millionaire, not because the Thai army pays a blue-chip salary, but because he sold his father’s land to Thailand’s top real estate tycoon, Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi, for 600 million baht, a generously above-market price.
Human civilization is no stranger to patronage. However, while kings and lords of the European Renaissance were patrons of artists, in modern Thailand, capitalists are patrons of generals and politicians. Also, while political donations are common in any democracy—whether legal or under the table due to the often obscene amounts—Thailand’s donations are driven less by ideology and more by mutual benefits. After all, if you donate to one party, but the party doesn’t become the government, then the right laws and concessions would not come your way.
As capitalists, you are wise enough to spread your investments to all the major players. Therefore, it doesn’t matter who wins the elections because Dhanin Chearavanont of the CP Group always wins. Also, Sarath Ratanavadi of Gulf Energy Development has won since Yingluck Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Government, through General Prayuth’s two terms in office, and now Paetongtarn’s government.
Therefore, whether in dictatorship or democracy, it is business as usual for the capitalists, as they patronize generals and politicians.
The Big Bosses
Thailand’s political landscape is dominated by the “big houses” headed by the “big bosses.” Their origins typically begin as provincial mafia bosses, who expand into legitimate businesses, but not in every case. Others are simply “influential people” whose families have long-controlled legitimate business interests in their provinces. However, while the companies may be legitimate, the bribes to obtain government concessions, such as road construction, are not. Bribes typically come in the form of overcharging the government, with an agreement that the bureaucrats and politicians involved would keep the change. After all, it’s just taxpayers’ money.
At the same time, the big bosses build patronage with the people through loans, gifts, and favors, making sure to deal with the bureaucrats when roads need fixing or water isn’t running. In return, the people owe them gratitude, loyalty, and votes. They expand into politics, first with local elections. Upon controlling their provinces or regions, they enter national politics. Big houses also form partnerships with one another to create a political party.
Typically, if a big house can swing ten parliament seats, that’s worth a ministerial position; swing 50 seats, that’s five ministries; swing a majority, that’s bumping shoulders with world leaders at fancy summits. Furthermore, the big houses behave like a dynasty. Hence, many young members of parliament and ministers nowadays are the big bosses’ sons and daughters, nieces and nephews, and second cousins twice removed.
Consider this story: In December 2024, in Prachin Buri Province, Chaimet Sitsaniphong was gunned down in the mansion of Soonthorn Vilawan, the province’s big boss, who has patronage ties to the Bhumjaitai Party. For 30 years, Chaimet had worked for Soonthorn and, in a leaked audiotape, claimed to have committed many “illegal deeds” for Soonthorn and even went to prison for Soonthorn. But Chaimet had the ambition to establish his own big house. At 49 years old, he was an up-and-comer. At 86 years old, Soonthorn’s sun was setting. Chaimet came under the patronage of the Pheu Thai Party to compete in a local election against Soonthorn’s handpicked candidate. Needless to say, the latter wasn’t happy. To clear the air, Chaimet, accompanied by his usual protection details of gunmen and police officers—just as every local strongman in every province would be—arrived at Soonthorn’s mansion. The bodyguards were instructed to wait outside, and Chaimet complied. It was a decision that would prove fatal, as he was left riddled with bullets. Soonthorn and his gunmen are currently in jail, awaiting trial. In the meantime, Chaimet’s wife will run in the election, backed by the Pheu Thai Party.
The story unfolds like a Hollywood mafia movie with a political twist. Pheu Thai is the government coalition leader. Bhumjaitai is the second-largest coalition partner. Both have nationwide patronage networks. They are necessary allies to prevent the People’s Party from power but fierce rivals in elections. Like all other conflicts between the two parties, the incident is resolved through a round of golf between Thaksin Shinawatra and Anutin Charnveerakul, Bhumjaitai’s leader, and other relevant people. After all, fierce rivalry aside, they share a greater purpose: to prevent the People’s Party from power.
The big bosses may take a small break during times of dictatorship, but they always return with democracy. But if they find the right compromise with the generals, there would not be a need for dictatorship.
The People’s Party
Young tycoon Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit has a vision: Thailand must change. Since there’s great economic disparity, let’s combat capitalist monopoly with social democracy. Since there’s great social inequality, let’s establish a welfare state. Since the Deep State destabilizes the country, let’s reform the military. Since the big houses keep Thai politics in the Dark Age, let’s create a political party, the Future Forward Party, full of young professionals and activists. Since draconian laws derail freedom of speech, let’s reform Article 112, the lese majeste law. Basically, he’s making enemies of all those who rule Thailand.
None of these would matter much, except Future Forward had the audacity to come third in the 2019 General Election with 80 seats. Hence, the Constitutional Court dissolved the party and banned all its executives from politics for ten years. The crime? Thanathorn lent money to Future Forward, which was interpreted as unconstitutional. The remnants of the party formed the Move Forward Party, with young businessman Pita Limjaroenrat as its leader. Again, audacity was displayed, winning the 2023 General Election.
But no worries, since everyone saw Move Forward as a threat, why not make a deal with Thaksin? Hence, Pheu Thai formed a government with conservative and pro-military parties. Then, the Constitutional Court dissolved Move Forward and banned all its executives from politics for ten years. The crime? They campaigned to reform the lese majeste law, interpreted as “an act that would lead to the overthrow of Thailand’s democracy with the king as the head of state.” The remnants of Move Forward formed the People’s Party, which is currently the parliament’s opposition.
The current regime is a balancing act between the generals, the capitalists, and the big bosses. It would upset the balance if the People’s Party come to power.
Patronage Democracy
We Thais love our sarcasm. Therefore, we refer to our political system as “half democracy” or “fractional democracy.” There are elections, but draconian laws and patronage networks stifle democratic governance, while military coups and Constitutional Court rulings loom as constant threats. A healthy democracy requires a strong opposition party, but those in power systematically weaken it through party dissolutions and the banning of politicians. This occurred with Thanathorn’s and Thaksin’s parties before the latter allied with conservatives to gang up on the reformists.
The power dynamic is also incestuous. Ambitious officers, businessmen, bureaucrats, judges, prosecutors, and politicians often attend executive courses like the National Defence College. This is where they connect and form partnerships, linking patronage networks or auditioning for a patronage network. Hence, cronyism and nepotism run rampant as business, politics, the military, the police, the judiciary, and the civil service are incestuously intertwined.
Simply put, Thailand’s political system is a patronage democracy. Voting is not a matter of ideology or vision for your country but loyalty to your patron. The generals, capitalists, and big bosses rule to benefit their patronage networks, giving the people just enough to keep them content with the status quo.
However, the rise of the young reformists signals that the people are no longer satisfied and are demanding change.
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